The Norweb Collection - An American Legacy

The presence of an American anti-submarine warfare squadron on Lagens was discovered by Spanish secret agents on the island, who quickly informed the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon. General Franco passed the information on to Germany, which immediately protested the violation of Portugal's neutrality to Salazar. Salazar was furious that American planes had been stationed on Portuguese territory without advising him first, and the failure to paint out their markings caused him to register a strong protest of his own with the British ambassador. Salazar was forced to make some highly creative arguments to the Germans and Spaniards, in an effort to explain away the American presence on Lagens. Norweb met with Salazar and assured him that British markings would soon be painted on the American planes.

No sooner had Norweb mollified Salazar over this issue when another, more serious problem arose. At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of January 9, 1944, Salazar was awakened by his aides and told that two American transports loaded with troops and escorted by naval vessels would soon arrive off Terceira Island. These, of course, were the first engineer battalion and its transport sent by the US. Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier, without telling Salazar. Not knowing what their intentions were, and believing the initial report which spoke of a much larger force than was actually there, Salazar instructed his local commander on Terceira to repel any attempted landing by force. He then called for the British ambassador, who was roused out of bed to hear Salazar's angry protest at the attempted invasion of Portuguese territory.

The British ambassador left Salazar and hurried to meet with Norweb to head off an armed confrontation that could be disastrous for both of them. Norweb reassured the Briton that he could explain the situation to Salazar, and made an appointment to see the Portuguese head of state that afternoon.

Norweb saw Salazar on the 9th, but it was not until 12 days later that Salazar relaxed and instructed his garrison on Terceira not to oppose the disembarkation of the American engineers. Norweb explained that the engineers were there to enlarge the British base on Terceira, which was not altogether true, and went on to say that another construction battalion was due to arrive at the island on February 17. He urged Salazar to alert the Terceira garrison about the impending arrival of the second convoy, to avoid a repetition of the crisis occasioned by the unexpected appearance of the first. For his part, Salazar insisted that the American squadron on Lagens had to leave. Norweb skillfully side-stepped the issue by replying that the planes now bore British markings, and so their presence was in accord with Salazar's earlier conditions. Salazar realized he was being presented with a fait accompli, and the planes stayed.

In March, 1944 Salazar was told that the British base on Lagens was to be used for support of operations in the European theatre of the war. The proposed American base on Santa Maria would be used exclusively to support operations in the Far East, and would not be built until the war against Germany had passed its height. The clear implication was that once Germany had been essentially beaten, Salazar's objections to an open American presence in the Azores would be obviated, since there would no longer be a threat of German attack against Portugal. In addition, he was told that Portuguese possessions in the Far East then occupied by the Japanese, in Timor and Macao, would be returned to him once they had been liberated. Norweb knew how strongly Salazar felt about the integrity of Portugal's overseas possessions, and he advised Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius that the best way of gaining base rights in the Azores would be through promising to guarantee the post war integrity of Portugal's foreign colonies.

Linking American bases in the Azores to the future of Portugal's overseas territories seemed to Norweb the best way of reducing Salazar's objections, but he did not foresee the direction this gambit would take during the months that followed. By July 1944, Salazar began to insist upon the presence of Portuguese troops in the forces sent to liberate Timor and Macao, clearly becausehe distrusted Allied promises and wanted his own forces on the ground on liberation day. News of Salazar's interest in taking an active, hostile role in the war in the Far East reached German Army Intelligence (the Abwehr), which promptly notified Japan.On July 7 the German government advised Salazar that any action taken by the Portuguese against Japan would be construed as action taken against Germany. Salazar immediately began playing for time, hoping that Germany would fall before he was forced to make a decision that would affect Portugal's overseas colonies.

Further delay would not be borne by the United States, however. Norweb received a peremptory cable from the Secretary of State dated July 8, which instructed him to press for an immediate decision on the Santa Maria base. The Secretary advised Norweb that if the base were to support operations in the Pacific in 1945, it must be fully built before the end of 1944. Norweb was told that the Secretary was disappointed that he had not already gotten Salazar's approval for the base, and was instructed to confirm receipt of this cable by immediate return. Clearly, the stakes had risen now, and the game was more important than Norweb had at first thought.

Two days later, Secretary of State Hull raised the stakes even higher. He cabled Lisbon on July 10, 1944 instructing Norweb to tell Salazar that any further delay in the granting of United States base rights in the Azores would jeopardize American support of the Portuguese economy. Norweb was advised to be blunt with this declaration, so that there would be no misunderstanding the importance the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed on the Azores. Norweb's instructions were repeated in another cable dated the following day, so there would be no doubt in the Ambassador's mind about the need for a quick resolution of the situation.